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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper describes work undertaken as part of 
the EU FP 7 TOSCA (Total Operations Management 
for Safety Critical Activities) project 
(http://www.toscaproject.eu) to develop approaches 
for integrating and enhancing safety, quality and 
productivity. One of the areas of research to be tack-
led is Design and Planning for Safety, and within 
this an approach is being developed to assess the 
risks involved in complex changes, for example due 
to the introduction of new processes or procedures, 
or, as in the case study discussed in this paper, non-
routine maintenance or inspection tasks. This meth-
odology combines the human factors method of task 
analysis with 4D process simulation to model the 
system and identify areas for improvement, both in 
terms of process safety and efficiency. 4D Simula-
tion is a method that brings together Discrete Event 
Simulation with a highly accurate 3D model of envi-
ronment. The discrete event simulation is then run in 
the 3D model and the results collected and analysed. 
This paper will explain the overall approach, present 
its application within the TOSCA project’s case 
study applied to the periodic inspection of pressur-
ized vessels for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) stor-
age. The inspection procedure, made of complex 
manual procedures, is applied rather rarely (at least 
every five years according to the law, but can be 
substituted with less disturbing methods, so in reali-
ty full internal vessel inspections are done every 10+ 
years) thus affected to staff turnover, meaning that 
previous experience and procedures may not be 
available at the time of testing. In this paper we will 
also present case study results in terms of recom-
mendations generated by this approach for the plant 
management for the coming full test procedure to be 
carried out. 
2 APPROACH 
The approach builds on using the principal meth-
ods such as Task Analysis (TA) in relation to 4D 
modelling and visualization of the operation under 
analysis. This renders a clear representation to the 
analysis team about the abstract details of the opera-
tion(s), next enabling them to apply the hazard iden-
tification methods,  (e.g., HAZOP), qualitative risk 
categories ranking, as well as efficiency (e.g., in 
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terms of resources needed, time, staffing, equipment, 
etc.). The overall approach is graphically presented 
in Figure 1 and suggests that decisions shall be taken 
after the optimization step – where recommenda-
tions from previous steps are compiled and assessed 
for the completeness and possibly about the tolera-
bility of the residual risk levels. However, for exam-
ple, in the case that the individual steps led to 
changes/additions to the list of tasks under consider-
ations, the whole assessment shall undertake an ad-
ditional update iteration. The details of the specific 
steps within the approach are given in the next sub-
sections. 
2.1 Task analysis 
Task analysis is used to describe and evaluate the 
human interactions in a system. As such, it forms the 
basis of many human factors risk assessments. Task 
analysis has been defined as the analysis of how a 
task is accomplished, including a detailed descrip-
tion of both manual and mental activities, task and 
element durations, task frequency, task allocation, 
task complexity, environmental conditions, neces-
sary clothing and equipment, and any other unique 
factors involved in or required for one or more peo-
ple to perform a given task (Kirwan, 1992). Without 
these important representations of the socio-
technical system, it would not be possible to correct-
ly analyse the system and identify and evaluate all 
the relevant risks. Task analysis methods are widely 
used by human factors professionals outside of risk 
assessment and these methods are usually appropri-
ate for supporting a risk assessment. Common task 
analysis representations include Hierarchical Task 
Analysis (HTA; Annett, 1967), Link Analysis 
(Chapanis, 1996), Operational Sequence Diagrams 
(Kirwan, 1992), Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA; 
Stanton, 2005) as well as methods used more widely 
outside the human factors domain such as Business 
Process Modelling (Aguilar-Saven, 2004). In this 
case, the Business Process Modelling approach was 
used as incorporated in the SCOPE software (Builes 
et al, 2014). SCOPE displays the task analysis in the 
form of a process map and further provides a tem-
plate for the analysis team to conduct a hazard iden-
tification technique, known assimilar to HazOp, on 
the tasks. The information to feed the task analysis 
can be gathered from documentation (e.g. proce-
dures) as well as individual experience. In the case 
of a rarely performed procedure, such as the case 
study presented here, the task analysis may be an it-
erative process that is refined as the procedure be-
comes clearer. The 4D modelling is a key tool in fa-
cilitating this improvement. 
2.2 4D modelling 
Simulation can be defined as the imitation of the 
operation of a real-world process or system over 
time. The act of simulating something first requires 
that a model be developed. This model represents 
the key characteristics or behaviours of the selected 
process (Banks, 2001). The model depicts the envi-
ronment in which the process itself takes place, often 
in a 3D manner; the simulation depicts the operation 
of the process over the fourth dimension, time. This 
paper focuses on the use of discrete-event simula-
tion, which models a process as a discrete sequence 
of well-defined events in time. Such events occur at 
a particular instance in time, marking a state change 
in the process (Robinson, 2004). Processes modelled 
in a discrete-event simulation must include prede-
termined starting and ending points, and a list of dis-
crete events that occur in between these points. Dis-
crete-event simulation is commonly used to monitor 
or predict procedures and processes in various indus-
tries, such as manufacturing. 
Use of 4D simulation is beneficial as it employs 
the “learn by doing” principle and Park (2011) state 
 
Figure 1: The graphical presentation of the proposed approach. 
that the positive impact of 4D simulation on produc-
tivity and safety is proven in construction processes. 
This paper focuses on a case study which includes a 
process, distributed across the production site, that is 
undertaken quite infrequently. One of the key prob-
lems with improving processes on distributed sites is 
the difficulty in visualizing the process (Sacks, 
2009) and Kang (2007) demonstrated that logical er-
rors in construction schedules could be detected 
quicker and more reliably using 4D models as com-
pared to 2D drawings. In this instance, a simulation 
would allow personnel to visualize and review the 
process virtually, identifying potential improvements 
as well as becoming better acquainted with it. It is 
often not possible to achieve this using the real envi-
ronment due to lack of access opportunities, risk of 
 
Figure 2: The SCOPE program interface during the task analysis of the case. 
damage to the plant, and risk of injuries to person-
nel. Using simulation to optimize, plan and prepare 
for infrequent, complex activities minimizes these 
risks during the actual operation. 
2.3 Safety Analysis 
The next step is safety analysis of the detailedthe 
hazard identification based on the tasks for the haz-
ards in the systemanalysis. This is based on using 
the task analysis outline as the basic functional anal-
ysis and to then perform a structured Hazard identi-
fication perform a more broad workshop similar to a 
HAZOP study (Kletz, 2006) where the nodes are on 
individual (sub)tasks instead of parts of a plant. The 
approach can be referred to as TASK HAZID (Leva 
et al 2012). The HazidAZOP study involveds a team 
workshop exercise with the team containing the ap-
propriate expertise, including knowledge of the plant 
and the planned operation, safety analysis, and hu-
man factors knowledge. The identification of haz-
ards was accompanied at the same time with a semi-
quantitative risk category estimation in order to sep-
arate between safety and productivity issues. That 
involved assigning the consequence classes on a 1 to 
5 point scale, and similarly assigning their likelihood 
of occurrence, while risk values were simply provid-
ed by multiplying both. 
In the case study presented here, the TASK 
HAZOP HAZID and risk categorization was carried 
out in the SCOPE software (Builes et al, 2014) 
which facilitates an examination of each node in the 
task analysis, allowing each deviation to be docu-
mented and analysed. The capability of holding the 
full analysis in one software application streamlines 
the analysis and simplifies the documentation of the 
analysis itself.  
2.4 Optimization 
Following the safety analysis, the optimization 
process can be applied in two steps. The first is op-
timization of the 4D model and its (sub)tasks is per-
formed with implementation and operating costs as 
the dependant variables.  The optimization then done 
through an iterative method which tests each itera-
tive arrangement over a statistically significant 
number of simulation runs. The result is a local op-
timization within the system based on cost. The sec-
ond step applies to the results of the task analysis 
and the TASK HAZID  HAZOP study, where the in-
itial list of tasks is next refined and subjected to fur-
ther optimization. We suggest that this optimization 
be done when hazards are already revealed (thus, 
e.g., after TASK HAZID) HAZOP study) and the 
team can concentrate on the further aspects, e.g., 
time duration of the main tasks, pertaining costs, etc. 
Finally a sensitivity analysis is done using a Pareto 
type optimization (Pareto, 1906) on a given sys-
tem/activity aspect shall be applied and opportuni-
ties for further improvements searched for and doc-
umented. 
 
 
Figure 3: 4D simulation illustration from the case animation. 
3 CASE STUDY – PROCESS AND RESULTS 
OBTAINED 
The case study was completed at the company 
Plinarna Maribor d.o.o., LPG storage site located at 
Maribor, Slovenia (project partner). The periodic 
pressure vessel testing procedure consists of a num-
ber of steps. The pressure vessels considered are two 
1000 m3 volume spherical above ground storage 
tanks. The product stored (LPG) must be removed 
first before the vessel is prepared for pressurized wa-
ter testing, emptying, internal visual inspection, ul-
tra-sound and X-ray spot testing, and finally to be 
put back into operation. The individual steps are 
connected in a logical order but the details and crite-
ria to proceed or not were not so clear at the start for 
the plant staff. The offer to analyse and re-develop 
the detailed procedure using the proposed approach 
outlined in earlier sections was accepted by the plant 
manager. 
3.1 Task analysis 
The task analysis was carried-out by the team and 
involving the site personnel. The task model was 
constructed in SCOPE software tool. The high level 
tasks and sub-tasks in the process were documented 
(Figure 2). The task analysis also captured actors, in-
formation, tools and duration of each envisaged task. 
During this step, 23 main tasks and 115 sub-tasks 
were identified. 
3.2 Creation of 3D visual and 4D model/simulation 
The site was first photographed extensively with 
a digital camera. Many pictures were taken from all 
possible angles of the buildings, equipment and lay-
out of the site. Those pictures were then used to 3D 
models of the buildings and equipment at the site us-
ing photogrammetry software. Next, a high-
resolution image of the site was taken from Google 
Earth. Finally, the 3D models of the buildings and 
equipment were placed on the high-resolution image 
to for a high accurate and easily recognizable 3D 
model of the entire site. 
A 4D simulation was built using the 3D model of 
the site and the information from the task analysis. 
The behaviour of the individual tasks were mod-
elled, including stochastic values for process and 
movement times. The simulation demonstrated the 
planned operation in order to allow the optimization 
of tasks and was annotated with information cap-
tured during the task analysis. Furthermore, the tool 
aided in documenting this complex testing procedure 
in advance and communicating the complex proce-
dure to a variety of personnel. Figure 3 illustrates a 
screen capture from the simulation. 
3.3 Safety analysis 
Overall, the Task based HAZOP hazard identifi-
cation study (TASK HAZID) operated as a central 
work point using both task analysis and 4D model-
ling as inputs and providing a list of recognized risks 
and additional safety measures as a main result. The 
team identified 26 potential deviations that could 
lead to risksaccidental scenarios. The TASK HAZID 
HAZOP study also suggested that we can expect 
three different main types of unwanted consequenc-
 
Figure 4: Task analysis diagrams for both the Original and the Optimized alternatives of the cold water pressure testing 
procedure. 
es with increasing severity – categories following a 
ladder approach:  
i. procedural risks (work delays); examples are 
too few fitter personnel at piping re-assembly, 
a too short crane arm too short to perform for 
PSVs removal from at the top of the 
spheresphere top, as well as a possible low 
flowrate water flow rate unknown in advance 
for sphere fill-up. 
ii. occupational safety risks; examples are per-
sonnel injuries due to LPG torch flame-off/on, 
work at height (sphere top), suffocation or 
electrocution hazards inside sphere, etc. 
iii. process safety risks; examples are damages to 
equipment and/or personnel in juries/fatalities 
due to water ingress into compressor, tank 
sphere static overload with water (deteriorated 
legs), spheres damage by applying pressure 
above 25 bar, etc. 
For the sake of brevity, the additional safety 
measures are were compiled as a list of recommen-
dations to be incorporate into the detailed toverall 
testing procedure by the plant manager – reported in 
Table 1. 
The TASK HAZID HAZOP study also rendered 
some additional tasks to be planned, possible re-
scheduling of subtaskstheir optimal order changed, 
Table 1: Summary of recommendations from the   HAZOPTASK HAZID study done over task analysis results. 
# Recommendation Related tasks 
1 Prepare a detailed written cold water testing procedure, following the tasks identified and implementing the spe-
cific recommendations given next. Suggested main topics: 
- General and specific planning of the testing (e.g., assurance of the contractors/equipment, list of all personnel 
(internal/external)), 
- Logic sequence of the tasks and sub-tasks, for each to consider validation criteria for completeness, as well as 
to mention anticipated hazards and required permitting. 
- Testing reporting - progress in time, persons involved - on suitable forms and check-lists, as well as to appoint 
approvals to next step(s). 
All 
2 Use of the torch with two pilot flames with thermal lock system - in order to assure reliable pilot flame 5, 23 
3 Consider purging of the remaining LPG gas in the storage tank at level between 95 % and 100 % by nitrogen, 
from either car tanker with vaporizer, or from the bundled bottles. 
Prepare a detailed nitrogen purging protocol, related to recommendation 1. 
7, 8, 22 
4 Permanently monitoring of the tank water fill-in process; to assure adequate staffing and specific appointed per-
son. 
Setting on the SCADA for an audible alarm at 98 % of full tank. 
7, 22, 23 
5 The measurement instruments used, are to be checked constantly during the test, related to strain gauges and 
movement of the tank observations.  
In case of the deviation(s) stop the procedure, thus the criteria must be defined prior the cold water testing starts. 
Note: additional task to be added to the previous task analysis to assure the mentioned equipment and contrac-
tors. 
7 
6 Plan the engagement of the contractors. Risk assessment of the operations and safety measures to be in place ac-
cording to the national legislation on occupational health and safety, e.g., regarding work at height, falling ob-
jects/tools, work in closed spaces or potentially oxygen depleted atmosphere/flammable atmosphere, as well as 
common workplaces. 
8, 16, 
18, 20, 
21 
7 Consider in the procedure to check the water level before removing the valve at the end of task 8 (in order to as-
sure low enough amount of the remaining gas inside tank). 
8 
8 In recommendation 1 consider also planning of the suitable crane with long enough arm to reach top of the 
sphere. 
8, 21 
9 While planning the high pressure water feed connection from the fire water system into the storage tank (con-
sidering the selected high pressure pump): 
- specify flexible hose rated for high enough pressure (30 bara) - validate with vendor/supplier, 
- as a back up plan for hose failure/leak, prepare in advance a fixed piping, or prepare sufficient fixed pipes 
and joints parts, to assemble connection on the spot. 
9 
10 Plan strict use of the validated and calibrated equipment (e.g., pressure and level measurements), validate also 
high pressure water specific rate, to be received from the contracted inspector. 
12 
11 Plan in a detail where to install blind flanges at the storage tank connections, in order to assure tightness at the 
connections during the high pressure test. 
12 
12 In recommendation 1 consider also correct sequence of actions to lower the water pressure in task 13 (13.3, re-
lated to the potential high pressure water jet, injuring the personnel). 
13 
13 Plan the electrical wiring and electrical installations to be installed only from the top opening, and not from the 
bottom opening, in order to prevent electrocution hazards, related to the potentially falling objects/tools for vis-
ual inspections, ultrasound testing and X-ray testing, expected to be done inside the storage tank. 
16, 18, 
20 
14 Check with the insurance company about the liability coverage on cold water testing procedure, considering the 
own and the contracted personnel, as well as the equipment used/present. 
All 
 
or specific precautions to be added. In general, this 
led to the update of the task analysis and its report, 
leading us to the Original as well as Optimized ver-
sions of the report and related graphical diagrams 
from the SCOPE programme – both are simultane-
ously presented for comparative purposes on Figure 
4. The reader will note that someSome tasks were 
merged (e.g., 9 and 10 merged into a new 9) in order 
to emphasise closely connected sub-tasks, decisions 
were explicitly added (new task 17, old 17 became 
18), some were added (final 25), thus leading to 22 
top level tasks in the Optimized alternative. 
3.4 Optimization 
Having obtained the Optimized list of tasks to be 
pursued within the testing procedure, the assessment 
of the total duration done, being assessed to about 
372 hours (15.6 days), considering 24 h per day and 
7 days per week work. After consultations with the 
plant management, it was spotted that some tasks in-
deed need more time than others (not a surprise), 
and some could be accelerated using more resources 
(e.g., contracted personnel) while same man-hours 
product is needed. The general optimization ap-
proach was to perform a time Pareto style analysis, 
namely, sorting the main tasks in decreasing dura-
tion time (info collected in task analysis), and for 
those most lengthy ones to discuss the alternatives 
for shorten them. The results are presented in Table 
2. We can note that top 5 main tasks out of total 22 
(22.7 %) are related to cumulative 69 % of total time 
envisaged, being about 372 hours. 
While not exactly following the proposed 80/20 
Pareto rule, the similarity (69/23) provided addition-
al insights about tasks that are worth of time optimi-
zation. In addition, for those tasks optimization op-
portunities were listed, and are to be added to the 
previous list in Table 1. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The approach to design and plan for safety is pro-
posed in this paperr. It consists of interconnected 
methods and tools used to applyfor task analysis, 4D 
simulations, safety analysishazard identification and 
optimization for a complex, hard to visualizecom-
plex testing and or overhaul operations. The ap-
proach ahs been tested on a case study consisting on 
pressure testing of LPG tanks and it  case study use 
of the proposed approach appears to be a very good 
example of its use. The case study provided 20 spe-
cific recommendations overall for the industrial 
partner’s management ofon how to plan in detail a 
rare and demandingthis infrequent and demanding 
testing procedure. However, the approach could be 
easily used or demonstrated onapplied on any other 
safety or production critical operation, above 
all,especially when the tasks are hard to visualize ad 
the human factors play a relevant role in it proce-
dures and human operation play a relevant role, as in 
the case under study and, more in general,(e.g. for 
Table 2: Summary of recommendation from the optimization step (considering top 5 out of 22 overall tasks (22.7%), related to 
69 % of overall anticipated time needed. 
# Duration (h) Main Task Optimization opportunities 
Duration (%) 
each cumulative 
1 72 16-Re-assemble entry flanges, 
primary valves and safety re-
lease valves (after previous 
completed) 
a.) Evaluate alternative to apply more person-
nel at re-assembly task for entry flanges and 
SRVs, as overall man-hours needed should be 
the same, thus less time here. 
b.) Evaluate alternatives in organizing work on 
8 h per day, against e.g., 24 ur-7 days per week 
basis, for whole testing procedure. 
19.2 19.2 
2 64 5-Fill with water c.) Expected water flow rate into is unknown; 
plan and perform a small scale tank fill-up test 
using same conditions and equipment in order 
to get at least some estimate. 
17.1 36.3 
3 50 10-Lower water pressure d.) Consider using larger pipework (over 2") 
and/or shorter pipework, in order to increase 
water flow out rate and save time here. 
13.4 49.7 
4 48 8-Install inspection equipment 
(this can be done from task 4 
onward or more than likely dur-
ing the filling with water) 
e.) Assess and plan which tasks and sub-tasks 
can run in parallel, e.g., this one during water 
flow out sub-task. 
12.8 62.5 
5 24 12-Visual inspection from inside 
(this task can be performed after 
the valves underneath have been 
dismantled) 
f.) Consider more inspection personnel to 
speed up the work. 
6.4 69.0 
 
batch processes and operations). The fFurther work 
on this approach will involve its field verification  
against the actual (the actual testing procedure is 
planned fto take place inor May 2015. The verifica-
tion will check whether the method missed on ) in 
terms “were any important tasks, or risks when 
comparing the actual activity with its missed in the 
analysis/planning phase.?” In addition, the authors 
plan toare currently working on perform a probabil-
istic risk assessment for of the overall procedure 
comparatively consideringto compare the Original 
and the Optimized procedure alternatives and link it 
withand use the data in athe cost-benefit analysis of 
the risk mitigated against avoided against the costs 
of the performing the analysis and careful procedure 
planningrecommendations identified. 
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